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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this action is vested in the Court of
Appeals by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-2(a) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal presents one issue:

Did the Board of

Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah err by giving
exclusive credit to Mr. Fullerton's inherently unbelievable
testimony that he was not fired for Mjust cause" in light of
the other evidence presented?

The applicable standard of

review is whether the agency's action is reasonable and
rational.

Bhatia v. Dept. of Employment Security, 834 P.2d

574, (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes and regulations are
determinative of the issue presented for review:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(b)(1)(Supp. 1991).

An individual is ineligible for benefits or for
purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(b)(1) For the week in which the Claimant was
discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in
connection with employment, not constituting a crime,
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the
commission, and thereafter until the claimant has
earned an amount equal to at least six times the
Claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered
employment.
2.

Rule 475-5b-102(l)(a) (b), and (c) of the Utah

Administrative Code (1991).

1.

The basic factors which establish just cause, and
are essential for a determination of
ineligibility are:
(a) Culpability.

This is the seriousness of the conduct or
the severity of the offense as it affects continuance
of the employment relationship. The discharge must
have been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm
to the employer's rightful interests. A discharge
would not be considered MnecessaryM if it is not
consistent with reasonable employment practices. The
wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the
context of the particular employment and how it
affects the employer's rights. If the conduct was an
isolated incident of poor judgment and there is no
expectation that the conduct will be continued or
repeated, potential harm may not be shown and
therefore it is not necessary to discharge the
employee.
(1) Longevity and prior work record are
important in determining if the act or omission is an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment.
An employee who has historically complied with work
rules does not demonstrate by a single violation, even
though harmful, that such violations will be repeated
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm
to the employer. . . .
(b) Knowledge.
The employee must have had knowledge of the
conduct which the employer expected. It is not
necessary that the claimant intended to cause harm to
the employer, but he should reasonably have been able
to anticipate the effect his conduct would have.
Knowledge may not be established unless the employer
gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a pertinent written policy, except in the case of
a flagrant violation of a universal standard of
behavior. If the employer's expectations are unclear,
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge
is not shown. A specific warning is one way of
showing that the employee had knowledge of the
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expected conduct. After the employee is given a
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct
objectionable conduct. Additional violations
occurring after the warning would be necessary to
establish just cause for a discharge. . . .
(c) Control
The conduct must have been within the power and
capacity of the Claimant to control or prevent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Writ of Review challenges the decision of the
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission which confirmed a
decision of the Administrative Law Judge that Albertsons lacked
just cause within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security
Act to discharge Mr. Fullerton.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Gayle M. Fullerton was employed by Albertsons, Inc. on
April 5, 1981. Albertsons discharged him on April 3, 1992.
R. 0001.

Mr. Fullerton was a forklift operator on the day of

his dismissal.

Albertsons discharged Mr. Fullerton because he

purposely damaged one of Albertsons' forklifts. R.0003.
Mr. Fullerton claims that he did not purposely damage
the forklift, but that he slipped, hitting the forklift as he
fell. R.0012.
Earl Ellis, a maintenance worker for Albertsons,
witnessed the incident.

He testified that Mr. Fullerton had

trouble putting a retaining plate on the forklift and that he
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"started beating on the machine."

Mr. Ellis asked

Mr. Fullerton to stop, but he would not. R.0032.
Prior to setting forth the relevant facts which
support the Appellant's position that the Board of Review erred
by exclusively crediting Mr. Fullerton's testimony in light of
the other evidence presented, the appellant shall hereby set
forth, in its duty to marshall the evidence, facts which
arguably support the Board's findings.
In affirming the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) in this matter, the Board of Review expressly
adopted the Findings and Conclusions of the ALJ, R.0082, which
specifically held that the claimant/appellee slipped and
inadvertently broke the battery plate. R.0083.
The ALJ relied upon the Claimant's own testimony that
he slipped.

The claimant stated:

. . .When I stood up. . .1 was on the north
side of the lift and Earl [Ellis] was on the
south side. . .[H]e [Earl] couldn't see my
feet. He was on the other side of the lift
when I stood up. I slipped on the roller[s]
[sic] that are somewhat oily anyway. And as
I. . .grabbed for my balance. . .1 brought
the plate down onto the lift. It chipped it
a little bit and it, in no way
broke. . .plastic. R.0041.l

1/
In the Claimant's Statement of Job Discharge, Exhibit 8A
attached to the transcript of the hearing before the ALJ, when
asked "What could you have done to prevent the incident or
situation which caused your discharge?" Fullerton wrote
"Better control of self." R.0002.

The Claimant states the plastic cover had already been
broken.

R.0041.2
The Claimant stated that he was not banging on the

equipment and that Ellis could not have seen whether he slipped
because he could not have seen the Claimant's feet from where
he was standing.

R.0052.

Furthermore, the Claimant in his

Statement Regarding Claims for Benefits, Exhibit 9A, states:
The battery was on rollers and I was
standing on the rollers. I lost my balance
and slipped while trying to regain my
balance I hit the lift cover with the
battery plate that was in my hand. I struck
the lift twice before I regained my
balance. R.0012-0013.
In this Appeal, the Appellant relies upon the
following additional relevant facts:
On April 8, 1991, the Claimant signed a
company policy sheet which set forth among
other causes of dismissal the "[u]authorized
possession of or damage to company funds,
property or merchandise," and
. . .the mishandling of company funds or
property. Any employee willfully damaging
company property. . .will be subject to
immediate termination. Exhibit 4, R.0008.
On April 2, 1992, Mr. Fullerton was seen "beating on"
one of Albertson's fork lifts.

Earl Ellis, maintenance worker,

stated:

2/
On page 2 of the Claimant's Statement of Job Discharge,
Exhibit 8B, when asked "How did you violate [company] policy?",
Fullerton wrote: "Damaged property". R.0003.
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It was early morning, I was working
graveyard shift at the time. He walked in
to ask for a battery change, and I told him
I'd be right there. I got up and wiped my
hands to walk out, by that time he'd already
pushed the other battery back in. He had
trouble putting the retaining plate in and
started beating on the machine. I asked him
to stop; he wouldn't stop. I told him, I
said, "You break that cover, I'm going to
have to turn you in." His response was, "I
don't give a shit, go ahead and turn me in.
It'll be the last thing you ever do."
R.0032.
Ellis stated that after that conversation, Fullerton
beat on the equipment a couple of more times and then left.
R. 0032.
broke.

Ellis stated that as he beat on the equipment it
R.0032.

Ellis stated that he personally saw Fullerton

physically bang on the battery cover several times. R.0034.
Ellis testified that Fullerton appeared "extremely angry about
something".

R.0049.

When asked if he could see where Fullerton was
standing at the time he was banging on the equipment, Ellis
stated that he was standing on the battery rack, which is a
platform made of steel with rollers through the center of it.
Ellis stated that Fullerton was standing on the platform next
to the rollers.

R.0032 and R.0033.

Later, during the hearing,

Ellis stated that he saw Fullerton striking the equipment while
he was standing on the rail.

R.0051.

Ellis also testified

that it is not normal procedure for someone to stand on the
rollers to change the battery.

R.0033.
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Ellis testified at the time he asked Fullerton to stop
hitting the equipment that the Claimant did not provide any
excuse for what happened.

R.0033.

Ellis states that the cover

was not broken prior to this time, that it was brand new.
R.0035.
Ellis testified that he and Fullerton had not had
problems with each other in the past.

R.0036.

Fullerton also

testified that the two had gotten along well previously.
R.0041.
Subsequent to the incident, Mr. Fullerton met with
Scott Bradshaw, the Perishable Superintendent of Albertsons.
Bradshaw states:
I called him [Fullerton] in after Lavell
James had approached me and told me what
Earl had told him. That's when I called
Mr. Fullerton in, and we talked about it;
and it started out where he denied anything,
as far as involvement with the battery, or
the lid, or whatever. And we proceeded to
tell him about what was said, and what we've
heard, and what Earl and Lavell had told
me. Later he said it was an accident, and
that it was—had grease on it and it slipped
out of his fingers . . . . R.0037 - 0038.
On cross-examination, Bradshaw stated that during his
interview with Mr. Fullerton, Mr. Fullerton did not state that
the battery cover was already broken nor did he make the excuse
that he was standing on the rollers and had slipped.

R.0038.

Darrell Kidd, Warehouse Operations Manager at the
Albertsons distribution center in North Salt Lake, testified
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that he made the decision to dismiss Mr. Fullerton.

R.0025.

The reason he gave for dismissal was the willful destruction of
company property, which decision was based upon testimonies
given to Mr. Kidd by Mr. Ellis, and based upon Mr. Fullerton's
past record of similar incidents. R.0026.
Mr. Kidd testified that Mr. Fullerton was suspended
for willful destruction of company property on January 31,
1990, when he kicked an office door and broke it. R.0026.
See, also, Exhibit 6, R.0010.3
Upon inquiry of this matter by the ALJ, Mr. Fullerton
stated:
I was goofing around. . . . I was just
going through the motions of kicking the
door, and I didn't kick it that hard. . . .
In Mr. Fullerton's Statement Regarding Claims for
Benefits, Exhibit 9A, Mr. Fullerton explained the January 31,
1990, incident as follows:
We were joking around. I pretended like I
was going to kick the door, my foot slipped
and I hit the door and cracked it at the
hinges. I didn't mean to do it. . . .
R.0012.
The ALJ admitted the evidence of Fullerton's prior
incident into the record but cautioned, "They will not be given
very much weight". R.0044.

3/
On cross-examination, Mr. Kidd testified that there is a
Union Contract in effect between Albertsons and Teamsters
(Footnote continued on next page)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only reasonable conclusion after reviewing all the
facts in evidence is that Mr. Fullerton wantonly and willfully
destroyed or attempted to destroy company property.

Such

conduct constituted grounds for immediate termination.
Mr. Fullerton knew, or should have known, that his actions of
striking company equipment would, or could, result in his
termination.

It was within Mr. Fullerton's control to stop

striking the equipment after being told by maintenance
personnel to do so.

The employer suffered loss as result of

Mr. Fullerton's actions.

The board of review and the ALJ acted

unreasonably and irrationally by unduly crediting
Mr. Fullerton's inconsistent and incredible testimony regarding
the incident in light of the overwhelming evidence presented to
the contrary.
ARGUMENT
THE CONDUCT OF MR. FULLERTON ESTABLISHED JUST
CAUSE FOR HIS TERMINATION
Under Utah law, if an employee is terminated for "just
cause" he is ineligible for unemployment benefits. See,
Stegen v. Department of Employment S e c , 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah

(Footnote continued from previous page)
Local 222 that covers the warehouse employees. R.0028.
Mr. Kidd testified that the discharge language in the Contract
states that warnings shall not remain in effect for a period of
more than one year.
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App. 1988).

The employer must establish that the employee's

conduct warranting dismissal involved three factors:
1.

Culpability;

2.

Knowledge of expected conduct; and

3.

The offending conduct was within the employee's
control.

Pro Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442
(Utah App. 1989).
Employee "culpability" is the first factor in the test
for just cause.

Board Regulations define culpability as "the

seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense as it
affects continuance of the employment relationship."

Bhatia v.

Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 574, (Utah App.
1992), quoting Utah Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-102(1)(a).
Board regulations further state that employers have a
"right to expect employees to refrain from acts which are
detrimental to the business" or which affect the good will of
customers, business, efficiency or discipline.
Admin. P. R.475-5b-107 (1991).
R.475-5b-108(l)(d) (1991).

Utah Code

See, also, Utah Code Admin. P.

("Culpability is established if

termination of the employee was required to maintain necessary
discipline in the company").

Mr. Ellis testified that

Mr. Fullerton intentionally "beat on" the employer's
equipment.

He testified that Mr. Fullerton appeared "extremely
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angry.M

Mr. Ellis stated that when he demanded that

Mr. Fullerton stop beating on the equipment, and threatened to
turn him in, Mr. Fullerton stated MI don't give a shit, go
ahead and turn me in.

It will be the last thing you ever do."

Mr. Fullerton denies using vulgarity and states that he made
the statement jokingly.
After this "conversation", Fullerton beat on the
equipment a couple of more times and then left.

The board

regulations recognize that:
"[a]uthority is required in the work
place to maintain order and efficiency.
An employer has the right to expect lines
of authority will be maintained; that
reasonable orders given in a civil
manner, will be obeyed; that supervisors
will be respected and that their
authority will not be undermined." Utah
Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-108(4) (1991).
Admittedly, Mr. Ellis was not Mr. Fullerton's direct
supervisor.

However, Mr. Ellis was responsible to maintain the

equipment and Mr. Fullerton was aware of this fact.

In

determining "when insubordination (resistance to authority)
becomes disqualifying conduct, the fact that there was a
disregard of the employer's interest is of major importance . .
[P]rovocative remarks to a superior, or vulgar or profane
language in response to a civil request may be insubordination
if it is conducive to disruption of routine, negation of
authority and impairment of efficiency."

Utah Code Admin. P.

R.475-5b-108(4) (1991); see, also, Hohmann v. Department of
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Employment Sec., 688 P.2d 465, 465-66 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)
(Employee who "became angry, vulgar and profane" in presence of
supervisor and others was properly denied unemployment benefits
for insubordination).
Fullerton's action was not a single isolated incident
of poor judgment.

He had been reprimanded and punished for

similar abusive misconduct in the past, when he kicked an
office door and broke it.

In any event, a single violation is

sufficient to demonstrate employment culpability.

In Kehl v.

Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985), a fork lift
operator, terminated for violating a company safety rule,
appealed the Board's denial of employment benefits.

The Court

affirmed stating:
"[T]he proper emphasis under the
culpability requirement should not be
upon the number of violations; rather,
it should address the problem of
whether the discharge was 'necessary to
avoid actual or potential harm to the
employer's rightful interest.fM IcL at
1134 quoting Utah Code Admin. P.
R.475-5b-102(l)(a).
Albertsons admits that it carries a heavy burden in
seeking to overturn the Board's factual findings.

It must

demonstrate that the findings are not "supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
Court."

Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451

(Utah App. 1991), quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)
(1989).

In this case, however, Mr. Fullerton's explanations
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simply do not constitute substantial evidence in light of the
whole record.

''Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."

Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 776

P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).
In the instant case, the record is replete with
evidence of disinterested eyewitnesses so as to make it
unreasonable for the Board to rely upon the uncorroborated and
self-contradicting testimony of Mr. Fullerton.

As Commissioner

Disera ably stated in his dissent to the Board of Review's
findings, the record is persuasive that "Mr. Ellis' version of
the incident leading to the Claimant's discharge is more
trustworthy than the Claimant's version."

The Commissioner

noted:
"Mr. Ellis had no apparent advantage to
be gained by saying the Claimant
repeatedly and willfully beat on the
battery plate. The Claimant, in fact,
testified that he and Mr. Ellis got
along well and no motive is suggested
in the record why Mr. Ellis would lie.
When asked if he could have been
mistaken about what he saw, Mr. Ellis
was steadfast in repeating that the
Claimant was beating on the plate in
frustration, not just trying to regain
his balance after a fall. The
Claimant, on the other hand, when
accused of beating on the employer's
property, had everything to gain by
claiming he slipped and accidentally
damaged the battery plate. The
Claimant's account is further thrown
into question because of his claim two
years earlier that he accidentally

-T*-

slipped and broke a door jam when was
kicking at a door while horsing
around. I find the Claimant's repeated
excuse of "slipping" when others
reported more willful behavior to be
suspicious." The Board of Review
decision, Disera dissent R.0083.
The dissent also recognizes that Mr. Ellis1 version of
the incident has not varied from the time he first reported
it.

Mr. Fullerton1s account of the incident, on the other

hand, has varied and evolved over time.

As Mr. Fullerton1s

supervisor, Scott Bradshaw, testified when the Claimant was
first told of the charges "he denied anything, as far as
involvement with the battery, or the lid".

After Mr. Bradshaw

informed Mr. Fullerton of the statements of Earl Ellis, he
admitted involvement and stated "it was an accident."
Mr. Fullerton then subsequently told Mr. Bradshaw that the
battery cover "had grease on it" and it "slipped out of his
fingers..."

During his interview with Mr. Bradshaw,

Mr. Fullerton did not state that the battery cover was already
broken, nor did he make the excuse that he was standing on the
rollers and that his feet had slipped and that he had lost his
balance.

Self contradictory testimony is inherently

incredible.

The ALJ and Board of Review erred by unreasonably

crediting such testimony in light of the other evidence.
"witness testifies falsely as to any material part of his
testimony, his testimony may be disregarded as a whole."
Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330 (Wyo. 1974).
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If a

In contrast, Mr. Ellis testified from the beginning
that he saw Mr. Fullerton beat numerous times on the equipment
in anger and frustration.

The ALJ "minimized" Mr. Ellis'

unequivocal testimony by finding that Mr. Ellis temporarily did
not see Mr. Fullerton1s feet, and thus, could not say whether
he was falling.

Mr. Ellis testified that he could not see

Mr. Fullerton's feet only momentarily, and testified that he
could still see that the Claimant was not falling.

He

testified that Mr. Fullerton was beating on the plate in anger,
which allegation is supported by the fact that Mr. Fullerton
struck the equipment again after Mr. Ellis told him to stop and
then threatened Mr. Ellis.
Mr. Fullerton claims to have accidentally hit the
battery plate twice.

In light of the other evidence, as

Commissioner Disera states, this explanation "does not ring
true."

To have accidentally hit the plate twice would mean

that Mr. Fullerton slipped and fell twice.
has not testified that this was the case.

Even the Claimant
To accept this

theory, the ALJ and the Board of Review had to completely
disregard and ignore the disinterested testimony of Mr. Ellis.
The ALJ and the Board of Review erred by either
ignoring or giving little weight to additional evidence
presented by the Appellant that Mr. Fullerton had intentionally
damaged company property in the past. Mr. Kidd testified that
Mr. Fullerton was suspended for willful destruction of company
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property on January 31, 1990 when he kicked an office door and
broke it.

In Mr. Fullerton's Statement Regarding Claims for

Benefit he explained the door-kicking incident occurred when he
was joking around and his "foot slipped" and he hit the door
and cracked it.
It is true that the union contract between Albertsons
and Teamsters Local 222 provides that employee warning notices
will not remain in effect for more than one year.

However, the

infraction for which Mr. Fullerton was discharged, willful
destruction of company property, was grounds for immediate
dismissal under the employer rules.

As Commissioner Disera

stated in his dissent:
"There was no need on the part of the
employer to go through any step-by-step
disciplinary procedure in the face of
the Claimant's action and they did not
do so. Referencing his past behavior
of kicking in a door was not necessary
to sustain a discharge, but only adds
strength to the employer's argument
that this was an employee who exercised
marginal control over his temper and
who the employer might reasonably
expect to see repeat destructive
behavior." Board of Review Decision,
Disera Dissent R.0084.
Indeed, evidence of Mr. Fullerton's prior willful
misconduct is consistent with Mr. Fullerton's own statement in
the Claimant's Statement of Job Discharge, Exhibit 8A where
Mr. Fullerton responds to the inquiry "what could you have done
to prevent the incident or situation which caused your
discharge?" by stating: "Better control of self".
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The employer established from the testimony of
Mr. Ellis and through the evidence of the prior incident as
well, that Mr. Fullerton had full knowledge of his expected
conduct.

Board Regulations "specify the employee need not have

intended to harm the employer but 'should reasonably have been
able to anticipate the effect his conduct would have'".
Bhatia v. Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d at 580,
quoting Utah Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-102(l)(b). An employer
may demonstrate an employee's knowledge through "a specific
warning" which warning is evidenced by the January 31, 1990
incident wherein the Claimant was suspended for his behavior of
kicking the door.

Such knowledge may also be demonstrated by

establishing the violation as one of a "universal standard of
behavior the employee is presumed to know".

Bhatia, 834 P.2d

at 580 citing Utah Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-102(1)(c).
Lastly, the employer needs to establish that the
conduct was within the power and capacity of Mr. Fullerton to
control or prevent.

If this court accepts the disinterested

testimony of Mr. Ellis that Mr. Fullerton was intentionally
beating on the equipment, it is self evident that the
Claimant's conduct was within Mr. Fullerton1s power to
control.

Even if Mr. Fullerton did not believe he was damaging

the property, when he was told to stop beating on the equipment
by the person responsible for maintaining the equipment he
could clearly have stopped at that point.
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CONCLUSION
The Board of Review's findings are not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the Court.

To affirm the ALJ's findings, the Board of

Review unreasonably credited Mr. Fullerton's testimony and
disregarded all of the contrary evidence on the record.

Such

evidence includes the disinterested testimonies of Mr. Ellis,
Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Kidd, the prior incident involving the
claimant, and the Claimant's own contradictory statements.

The

Appellant's evidence on the record clearly establishes the
employee's culpability, knowledge and control.

For these

reasons, the Court should reverse the unreasonable findings of
the Board of Review and deny the benefits sought by the
Claimant.
DATED this

day of November, 1992.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By.Robert
*—^—w+~^2^
G. Wing
Roger J. McConkie
Attorneys for Petitioner
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